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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the infrastructure–decentralization nexus in the production of health 
services with a particular emphasis on the issue of health infrastructure. The first part of the 
paper presents evidence on health services and infrastructure spending in health for various 
countries or groups of countries showing the importance of infrastructure spending in the 
provision of health services. The second part of the paper examines why and how health services 
are joint production with collective and private characteristics. These characteristics affect the 
decentralization of such services and thus the decentralization of health infrastructure; it also 
raises the issue of who should finance what in health care. The third part examines case studies 
and policy choices in USA, Canada and Switzerland related to various aspects of health care and 
health infrastructure financing. 
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Introduction 
1. This paper examines the infrastructure–decentralization nexus in the production of 
health services with a particular emphasis on the issue of health infrastructure. 
2. The first part of the paper presents evidence on spending on health services and 
infrastructure spending both in general and in health for various countries or groups of 
countries showing the importance of infrastructure spending in the provision of health 
services The second part of the paper examines how some of the characteristics of 
health services affect the decentralization of such services and thus the 
decentralization of health infrastructure. The third examines case studies and policy 
choices.  
 
1. Health spending and health infrastructure spending; what is the evidence  
3. This first part of the paper pulls together what evidence we were able to gather on 
health spending, infrastructure spending and health infrastructure spending, total and 
decentralized. Unfortunately, as the reader will see, the more relevant to us the data, the lesser 
its availability. We begin with a table (1) on health spending for groups of countries covering 
the world, followed by a set of tables (2a and 2b) examining some evidence on health 
spending for subsets of countries (Low income in Africa; low and middle income in South 
/Central America) of potential interest to the reader before turning to a last set of tables (3 and 
4) on health infrastructure spending for both the OECD countries and other countries for 
which data could be found.  
4. Before proceeding to the tables, one should be aware of possible measurement issues 
that make international and inter-temporal comparisons difficult. We illustrate this with an 
example.  Eurostat
1
 classifies hospitals that obtain more than 50 percent of their revenues 
from billing their patients as market enterprises and not as part of the public sector even if 
they are publicly owned, see their deficits paid for by the government while their patients’ 
bills are covered by insurance schemes mandated by the government. Hence in 2009 and 
2010, public hospitals of five Swiss cantons (Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Fribourg, Glarus and 
Zürich) were classified as belonging to the private sector;
2
 but in 2012, since a new financing 
scheme will impose a maximum of 45 percent of revenues from billing patients they will 
again be classified as public.  
5. We present in Table 1 data on health expenditures (share of GDP and in US$ per 
capita) and public health spending for 2010 using 32 World Bank groupings of countries. It 
shows extremely large variations in per capita health spending  with North American 
                                                          
1. SCN 2008, p.640, paragraphs 22.28 et 22.29 ; also IMF 2001, p.12 ; eurostat 2010, p.14; Manual of 
Government Deficit and Debt, Implementation of ESA95, Eurostat Methodologies and Working Papers, 
European Commission, Luxembourg, 2012, 4th edition, pages 14-16.)  
2. Source: Statistique financières 2010 de la Suisse, Rapport Annuel,  Administration fédérale des Finances, 
OFS, Neuchâtel 2012, Série 18, pages 17-19. www.bfs.admin.ch>office fédéral de la 
statistique>thèmes>18>finances publiques>publications. Despite the fact that the all cantons have hospital 
networks, some publicly-owned hospitals are taken out of the public sector statistical data, in compliance with 
the SEC95 statistical system.  
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spending 200 times higher than the lowest spending region while the share of GDP spent on 
health varies from 4 percent to 17 percent and that of public health spending from 30 percent 
to almost 80 percent of total spending on health.  
6. In addition to this data from the World Bank, we also examined a total of thirty World 
Bank Public Expenditure Reviews. We report the relevant information in tables 2a-2b  for the 
period 2000/5 -10 
Latin America 
7. We found information for six countries; it is presented in table 2a. We also found 
some information on decentralized provision of health services. In the case of Honduras, some 
municipalities provide health services through groupings of municipalities (known as 
mancomunidades). Also some of the municipalities provide financial or operational support 
(such as ambulances or security services) to Ministry of Health facilities. Mancomunidades 
depend mostly on municipal financing (74 percent), with user charges (12 percent) and 
international sources (14 percent) accounting for the rest for current spending. A sample of 
municipalities reported spending 6 percent of the municipal budget on health with 55 percent 
going to construction or repair of health centres. But only 20 percent of this spending came 
from their own resources, with the rest funded from various central transfers.  
8. Turning to Nicaragua one finds that in 2006, the current health budget was financed 
mainly by the Treasury (83 percent), but capital expenditures remain heavily dependent on 
foreign aid with 68 percent thus funded in 2006.  
Africa 
9. We found some information for nine countries which we present in table 2b.We also 
have some information on decentralization of health spending. In Mali deconcentrated 
(regional) health spending accounts for about 10 percent of central government spending in 
2007-2008, a small share. In Sierra Leone, transfers for health to local councils have been 
steadily increasing in recent years, now accounting for 30 percent of the central health budget. 
In Tanzania, in 2009-2010, health spending is split 50-50 between the central and local 
government for both recurrent and development (capital) spending.  
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Table 1. Importance of Health and Public Health Expenditures by Country Group, 2010 
World Bank Group of Countries Health 
Expenditures Per 
Capita – 2010 
(current USD) 
Health 
Expenditures as 
Percent GDP - 2010 
Public Health 
Expenditures as 
Percent Total Health 
Expenditures - 2010 
Arab World 251.8 4.34 60.95 
Caribbean small states 501.56 6.1 56.98 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 500.18 6.89 69.51 
East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 182.82 4.75 53.38 
Euro area 3969.01 10.84 76.15 
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels) 2203.84 9.76 75.89 
Europe & Central Asia (developing only) 438.68 5.81 64.98 
European Union 3368.31 10.41 77.37 
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) 39.1 5.96 43.12 
High income 4876.79 12.55 65.1 
High income: non OECD - - - 
High income: OECD 5093.26 12.85 65.1 
Latin America & Caribbean (all income 
levels) 
671.46 7.68 50.22 
Latin America & Caribbean (developing 
only) 
670.24 7.69 50.18 
Least developed countries: UN 
classification 
34.39 5.13 42.84 
Low & middle income 198.95 5.69 51.81 
Low income 26.91 5.34 38.78 
Lower middle income 70.93 4.28 39.54 
Middle East & North Africa (all income 
levels) 
322.23 4.64 57.8 
Middle East & North Africa (developing 
only) 
203.18 5.28 50.15 
Middle income 225.13 5.7 52.04 
North America 8049.79 17.24 54.18 
Not classified - - - 
OECD members 4364.71 12.57 64.94 
Other small states 264.57 6.14 63.57 
Pacific island small states 175.83 6.6 78.23 
Small states 314.81 6.15 61.78 
South Asia 47.46 3.88 30.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 85.01 6.47 45.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) 84.32 6.5 45.07 
Upper middle income 379.71 6.1 54.38 
World 950.38 10.39 62.76 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Database (http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
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Table 2a: Health related information, Public Expenditure Reviews 2000-2010, Latin America 
 Expenditure 
on 
health/GDP 
Year for 
column 1 
Public 
expenditure 
on 
health/GDP 
Year for 
column 3 
Health 
expenditure 
in public 
spending 
Year for 
column 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Belize 5.2 2001-2002 X X X X 
Dominica * 6.0 2001-2002 4.3 2001-2002 X X 
Haiti ** 7.5 2003-2004 2.75 2003-2004 5.7 2002-2007 
Nicaragua X X 3.1 2006-2007 14 2006-2007 
Paraguay X X 2.3 2003-2004 9-10% Recent years 
El Salvador 8 2001-2002 3.7 2001-2002 X X 
Source: Authors using World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews. 
 
 
Table 2b: Health related information, Public Expenditure Reviews 2005-2010, Africa  
 Public 
expenditure 
on 
health/GDP 
Year for 
column 1 
Health 
expenditure/ 
public 
spending 
 
Year for 
column 3 
Capital 
spending / 
health 
budget 
Year for 
column 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Burundi  n.a.  8.5 2008   
Guinée-Bissau 3.5 2007     
Liberia 2.3 2007 7.8 2009 6.0 2010 
Mali   7.4 2007 36.1 2006 
Uganda  1.7 2009 9.8 2006   
RDC-Congo   4.1 2007 22.0 2006 
Tanzania  2.4 2009 3.7 2008 9.3 2010 
Sierra Leone 1.3 2008 7.5 2007   
Chad  1.0 2007-2009   21-22 2005-2006 
Source: Authors using World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews. 
 
10. Table 3 presents information on gross capital formation in the health sector for OECD 
countries.  
11. Table 3 shows that gross capital formation (public + private) for health purposes is 
usually of the order of 0, 3-0, 5 percent of GDP. The USA with 0.7 or Canada (0.63) are high 
and Italy (0.35) France (0.40) or Germany (0.41) in that range. The breakdown between 
public and private reflects the organization of health services in each country. For example the 
private share is thrice the public share in the USA while the public share is six times the 
private share in Canada reflecting how hospitals, clinics and other health facilities in both 
countries are owned and financed. As a share of health spending, gross capital formation in 
health is usually in the 3-6 percent range in OECD countries. This is a bit lower than the 
figures reported in Table 4 for a sample of non-OECD countries which are more in the 5-8 
percent range, reflecting perhaps both a greater unmet need or catch-up phase and a 
population growing faster.  
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Table 3: Privately and Publicly Financed Gross Capital Formation in the Health Sector for OECD 
Countries:  2010 or earlier (*) as Percent of Total Health Expenditure and GDP 
 Publicly Financed Gross Capital 
Formation in Health Sector, 2010 
Privately Financed Gross Capital Formation 
in Health Sector, 2010 
 As % GDP as % Total Health 
Expenditure 
As % GDP As % Total Health 
Expenditure 
Australia* 0.2 2.42- 0.27 3.21- 
Austria 0.35 3.16 0.24 2.14 
Canada 0.53 4.63 0.09 0.77 
Chile* 0.12 1.79- - - 
Czech Republic 0.19 2.56 - - 
Denmark 0.41 3.67 - - 
Estonia 0.01 0.15 0 0 
Finland 0.36 3.98 0.08 0.89 
France 0.25 2.18 0.15 1.33 
Germany 0.26 2.21 0.15 1.28 
Greece* 0.08 0.82 0.3 3.08 
Hungary 0.19 2.38 0.04 0.51 
Ireland 0.28 3.04 0.04 0.45 
Israel* 0.1 1.34 0.15 - 
Italy 0.21 2.24 0.14 1.52 
Korea 0.12 1.7 0.24 3.41 
Mexico* 0.15 2.57 - - 
Norway 0.3 3.16 0.05 0.55 
Poland 0.31 4.4 0.13 1.86 
Portugal 0.23 2.11 0.34 3.21 
Slovak Republic 0.04 0.49 0.47 5.16 
Slovenia 0.32 3.51 0.06 0.65 
Spain 0.21 2.24 0.03 0.29 
Sweden 0.4 4.21 0.1 1.02 
Turkey* 0.22 4.05 0.1 - 
United States 0.16 0.93 0.53 2.99 
Source: Authors using OECD (2012), "OECD Health Data: Health expenditure and financing", OECD Health 
Statistics Database).  
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Table 4.  Spending on Capital Formation of Health Care Providers in 21 non –OECD Countries, 
2005-2010 (as percent Total Health Care Expenditure) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Afghanistan - - - 1.8 - 
Armenia 9* - - - - - 
Bangladesh 7.3 8.6 6.3 - - - 
Bhutan - - - - 20 
Burkina Faso 6.3 5.6 7.9* 9.3* 11.3* - 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
- - - 3 - - 
Ethiopia - - 6 - - 
Georgia 3.7 6.6 6.5 2.7 3.4 - 
Kenya 1.3 - - 3.6 
Liberia - - 7 - - 
Micronesia 3.4 6.8 4.9 1.9 - - 
Mozambique 6 9.02 - - - - 
Myanmar 3.1 - - - 
Qatar - - - - 18 15 
Rwanda - 7 - - - - 
Seychelles - - - - 8* - 
Sri Lanka 10.6 10.9 - - - - 
Tanzania 5.7 - - - - 
Vanuatu 5.2 - - - - - 
Zambia 2.2 2.65 - - - - 
Sources: Authors using various National Health Accounts for the relevant country WHO Note: we included all 
countries that had the relevant information available Data are from reports such as for Kenya: 
http://www.who.int/entity/nha/country/ken/kenya_nha_2009-2010.pdf. 
 
 
12. The main conclusions one can draw from this part of the paper are:  
 significant differences in the importance of health expenditures between groups of 
countries reflecting mainly their relative income level but also the organisation of 
health services within each country; 
 the fact that spending on health infrastructure is more important as a share of health 
spending in emerging countries than in OECD countries .Overall, one expects that it 
accounts worldwide for about 5-7 percent of health spending and 0.3-0.5 percent of 
GDP  
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2. The inter-governmental assignment of health services /infrastructure: what 
principles should apply? 
13. In this part of the paper, we first briefly recall the principles of decentralization and 
review a few empirical studies slinking decentralization and health outcomes. We then 
examine issues linked to the decentralization of health services and finally discuss 
characteristics of health infrastructure with regards to decentralization. We attempt to assess if 
the characteristics of health services /infrastructure makes them different from other publicly 
provided services in terms of:  
 the desirable degree of decentralization;  
 the inter-governmental coordination arrangements both vertical and horizontal once 
a degree of decentralization has been settled. 
2.1. Decentralization principles and empirical work on decentralization and health 
14. Governments have two main ways to carry out their responsibilities to ensure the 
provision of a specific activity or service: spending, including tax expenditures, and 
regulation. These powers should be clearly assigned to appropriate levels of government. The 
two classic contributions to the literature on decentralization are those of Musgrave (1959) 
and Oates (1972). Musgrave (1959) suggests that, for conceptual purposes, the activities of 
government should be separated into three functions or branches: macroeconomic 
stabilization, redistribution, and resource allocation. Thus, health activities belong to both the 
allocation branch for the supply and production of health services and in the redistribution 
branch for access to services for the population who has not the capacity to pay – leaving 
aside at this point the political principle of “right to health for everyone”.  Oates (1972) puts 
forward three criteria to assign specific roles to specific levels of government as follows:  
 Economies of scale. The existence of significant economies of scale constitutes an 
argument for a higher level of government to provide a particular good or service. In 
the area of health services, the personalized nature of many services makes health 
services a poor candidate for gains from scale 
 Heterogeneity of preferences also matters. Groups living in different parts of a 
country may display strong heterogeneity of preferences. Decentralization is an 
appropriate response to these different preferences if these groups are separated by 
political (devolved) borders that match those of areas with groups with differentiated 
preferences or circumstances. By extension, heterogeneity of circumstances also 
matter with different environments in terms of climate or topography. On this point 
Derycke and Gilbert (1988, p.8) add the dimension of distance to service in the 
definition of local public service. So the inbound distance – the case for hospital – 
from the residence (or the place of accident) of the potential user to the place of 
service delivery or the outbound-distance from the place where inputs (labour, 
capital) are assembled into a service provision mechanism and the place where the 
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service is delivered – the case of the fire extinction brigade from the fire station to 
the location of the fire (or the cat in the tree)
3
. 
 The presence of externalities, negative or positive, has an impact. If some of the 
activities of one government at a given level have important external effects on the 
individuals or businesses located in other jurisdictions or on other governments at 
the same or a different level, then these activities should be more centralized, or at a 
minimum the actions of lower-level authorities should be well coordinated. 
15. Finally one should note that emulation, also referred to as competition, which helps 
increase or introduce best practices in government, requires at least two, and probably more, 
units involved in a given activity. This is an argument for decentralizing government 
activities.  
16. Before going further into the analysis, it seems relevant to inquire if there is evidence 
that varying levels of decentralization may matter to health outcomes. If the answer is no, then 
the above discussion is moot.  
17. There are at least two strands of literature of potential interest in answering this 
question. The first can be characterized as analytical/ descriptive with the work of Saltman et 
al (2007) a good example. In it, one finds discussions of issues such as what is meant by 
decentralization in health (chapter 1) or the difficulty of measuring decentralization (chapter 
3).  Chapter 4 concludes by reminding us that: “most decentralization initiatives will be driven 
by a combination of functional performance–related concerns, legitimacy issues and self-
interest’’ (p.74). Interesting to note is that nowhere does Saltman et al examine issues linked 
explicitly to infrastructure.  
18. The second strand of literature is of an empirical nature. Using data on a sample of 
countries (Robalino et al, 2001; Jiménez-Rubio, 2010) or on subnational units within a 
specific country, various authors examine the impact of decentralization on either health 
spending, health outcomes or both. Examples of country specific work includes that of Hiroko 
and Jütting (2007) who examine for China the impact on infant mortality using data for 
twenty-six provinces over seven years of within province decentralization (county level data). 
They find that ‘’more decentralised provinces perform better with respect to health outcomes 
if two conditions are met: first, if a functioning transfer system is established between the 
province and county levels, and second, if county governments’ own fiscal capacity is 
strengthened’’ (p.21). Or Asfaw et al (2004) examine for India the impact on rural infant 
mortality rate for fourteen states over the 1990-1997 period. They conclude that ‘’Generally, 
the results of the study indicate that fiscal decentralization can help to reduce infant mortality 
rates and political decentralization can be one important factor that affects its effectiveness’’. 
Or finally Simatupang (2009) examines the case of Indonesian municipalities for 2006, noting 
that: ‘’decentralization brings mixed changes to measured health outcomes. The results show 
improvement of mortality rates with significant declines in infant under 5 mortality rates as 
well as longer life expectancy. But some decentralized health services seem to be less 
                                                          
3. Sai = Sa N -  where Sa is the supply of collective good “a” and N the total number of “i” potential 
consumers.  –α gives the characteristic of the local versus central publicness:  if α=0, then N=1 and characterizes 
a pure collective good since the quantity offered to the “i” user is available for all others; α=1 correspond to a 
pure market good and consumer “i" receives 1/N of the total supply. With 0 <  < 1, the good supply is more or 
less divisible, that is local or a club service.   can have various specificities . 
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available, as percentage of labor assisted by medical workers, vaccination coverage, and 
number of active contraceptive users show declining trends’’ (p.73). Each study uses a 
specific measure of decentralization but none take into account explicitly the decentralization 
of health infrastructure.  
19. Overall, the literature supports the view that decentralization in the provision of health 
services can lead to better outcomes; but health infrastructure expenditures as such are not 
separately examined. 
2.2. Decentralizing health; a functional analysis 
20. How should one thus apply the criteria noted above to the field of health? One must 
first clarify that production of health involves numerous activities that may be assigned to one 
or another level of government. In what follows we will assume a three level country with a 
central, regional and local governments. These are devolved entities that have some budgetary 
and regulatory autonomy and that have their own elected or coopted autonomous decision 
makers.  
Categories of health services 
21. Assume a fully public health system with no private provisions of health services. 
Such a system must provide three kinds of health services: population health, universal access 
on demand and individual health. Population health, or public health as it is also called, offers 
services that are often preventive in nature, that do not target a specific individual but that 
benefit the population in general. These may be informational such as advice on hand washing 
or nutrition or health enhancing by vaccinating individuals against diseases.  Individual health 
is comprised of both universal access on demand and curative services. “On demand access”  
means that potential users  know that there is a network of (public) hospitals/clinics always 
available to them and ready to provide curative services in case of accidental or emergency 
need. It is a pure public good: everyone benefits from the same quality and quantity of 
potential access to health (usually hospital) care.
4
 Both population health and universal access 
on demand are public goods (non-rival and non-excludable). Curative individual health 
services are offered to specific sick individuals with the aim to restore or maintain the health 
of individuals through drugs, surgery and other interventions (speech therapy…). They are 
private or individual services (i.e. private goods rival and excludable). Decisions must be 
made on the quantity and quality of services provided including their accessibility (age, 
location…), on the quantity and quality of the human and physical capital inputs used to 
provide them and thus on their remuneration and on the financing of these services.  Tables 5 
and 6 presents some answers to the various questions raised above; Table 5 addresses who 
should do what and Table 6 how should institutional governance be organized.  
  
                                                          
4. Note that the quality of the network (design, output…) will affect the health outcomes but a network of a 
given quality gives the same level universal  access to potential beneficiaries.  
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Table 5: Provision of health services by level of government and type of service  
Choice 
type 
Specific issue Considerations Decision maker Implementation 
Population 
health  
Who should set 
standards for 
vaccination, 
communicable 
diseases cattle disease 
control, food quality 
Spillovers within or 
beyond national 
borders (international 
treaties) 
Supra national body 
(EC) Central 
government or for 
food importing 
government (USA 
FDA rules) 
National Regulations 
Or 
financial incentives / 
penalties 
Population 
health 
Who should 
implement public 
health measures 
(vaccination, …) 
Heterogeneity such as 
cultural sensitivity 
varying on a 
geographical basis 
National for some 
inputs (vaccines) 
Level in charge of 
primary health 
center 
(regional/local?) for 
distribution 
Primary health 
center 
+ 
Special teams 
Hospital / 
Clinic 
network 
Territorial 
(geographical) 
distribution of hospital 
centres 
Economies of scale,+ 
horizontal and vertical 
coordination of 
services, specialities 
and equipment 
Central and regional 
government in 
partnership 
Regional and local 
depending on the 
nature of the service; 
central or inter-
regional for high-
tech specialities 
Individual 
health 
Who should set 
standards for 
individual health care 
(delineation between 
standards and private 
health services, 
administrative prices 
of medical and 
hospital service, 
waiting lists, 
procedures covered...? 
No spillovers 
(services are rival and 
excludable);  
redistributive 
consideration (user’ s 
capacity to pay) 
Government that is 
main payer –higher 
individual territorial 
mobility for medical 
service calls for 
centralization 
 
Issues to be 
addressed: 
cooperation 
agreements : border 
areas, specialized 
services  
Individual 
health 
How is access to 
health centers 
determined : free or 
boundary restricted 
No spillovers 
Economies of scale 
Minimum size for 
excellence  
Source: Authors.  
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Table 6: Issues in the Institutional Governance of the Health Sector 
General Question Specific questions 
Who decides where to 
build/maintain/operate health 
facilities? 
Assuming that who decides which health and hospital services are attributed 
to primary, secondary and tertiary health centers. Issues then are: 
First, how is vertical coordination secured?  
Second, appropriate distances to service centers must be set in order to 
optimise the network.  
Finally if private clinics and hospitals are considered part of the health 
network, under what conditions? 
How is health infrastructure 
financed? 
There are two issues here. One is the funding mechanism used which can 
range from spending from general revenues to various forms of public 
borrowing to PPPs. Second is what government mobilizes this funding for 
public facilities. Is this based solely on the location and type of infrastructure 
or are interactions accounted for in the capital funding as such rather than 
solely in the current funding (with some compensation for the access to 
facilities)? 
Who trains (sets quotas/provides 
facilities) health staff?  
How much (inter)national mobility exists in trained health staff? Are diploma 
delivered in one region (country) recognised in another? 
How is the limit set, by whom, between in-house doctors and independent 
doctors, specialists and nurses? 
Who sets the pay of health staff? 
Their pension arrangements? 
Consideration of mobility and competition between public health facilities  
operated by different level of governments ; Also consideration of mobility 
public – private; mobility in-house – independent doctors 
Who hires/fires health staff? 
How much room of manoeuvre hospital/clinic boards have? Are employees 
covered by public law or by private labour market law? 
Who decides on the structure (fees, 
taxes…) of financing of health 
services (given the amounts 
offered)? 
One must first distinguish between the three types of services Population 
health is usually paid out of general revenues It is universal access and 
curative services that tend to have a fee based funding component. In those 
cases, who sets the shares of the various sources and the specific fees? If 
user-pay is implemented, how much is paid through health and accident 
insurances and how much is charged directly to the beneficiaries? In hospital 
stays, is there a difference between medical services and accommodation 
pricing?  
 
Who supervises the quality of 
practice? 
Competition and emulation between service units might not suffice. 
Source: Authors. 
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22. In both tables we assume a three tier system: primary care centers that is basic health 
units or clinics staffed by GPs and nurses or at least nurse practitioners and available at the 
municipal/village level; secondary health centers staffed by specialists MDs and specialized 
staff (speech therapist…) at the regional level; tertiary health centers in a few locations in the 
country offering specialized care for the more complex problems.
5
  
23. Aside from infrastructure, how does health compare to other commonly decentralized 
public services? One can only answer this by distinguishing between population and 
individual curative health and comparing this with for example education and roads; this is 
done in Table 7.  Population health is the best candidate for centralized production while 
individual health is better suited for decentralization; yet both can be, and often are, provided 
by the same institutions such as local health centres. This is different from the education 
system where the provision of compulsory and higher education is usually carried out by 
separate institutions in different locations (although some facilities may be rented out by one 
body to another).  Or from the provision of roads which are distinct in their spatial nature 
even if interconnected.  So jointness of production appears to matter more for the two types 
(population and individual) of health services at the primary health center level than for other 
types of public services. This is much less of an issue at the secondary and tertiary level since 
these institutions specialize in individual health care.  
24. The main conclusions one can draw from tables 5, 6 and 7 are first that the provision 
of health services is more akin to a joint production decision than the provision of other 
publicly provided services, due to the overlapping of public and private services offered by a 
specialized personnel.  The general consequence of this for health infrastructure is the need 
for substantial vertical and horizontal integration/coordination. Second, the joint nature of 
health services, that is on the one hand universal access, emergency services and hospital 
network (collective) and on the other hand individual curative services (private), calls for 
nuances in financing health infrastructure. When both categories of services are offered, one 
cannot ask that user charges billed to individual patients cover the total infrastructure costs; 
there must be a public funding. Inversely, if (private) clinics do not offer services that are 
collective by nature, they should not receive public financing. 
 
 
  
                                                          
5. If one adds a parallel set of private providers of health services then one must also address issues of 
coordination between the public and private services and of the regulation of private providers. Private hospital 
and clinic centers offer mainly curative or individual health services, which are private services. The questions 
are whether and how they contribute to population health and, more important, how they accommodate the 
constraints (in terms of organisation, infrastructure and medical staff) of acting as part of in the health network 
that offers universal access (mainly by offering minor emergency services and non-discriminatory tariffs). 
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Table 7 Comparative impact of determinants of decentralization: education, health and roads 
 Population 
health 
Individual health Compulsory 
Primary / 
secondary 
education 
Higher 
education 
Local 
(market) 
roads 
National 
roads 
Economies of 
scale 
High (vaccine 
production, 
information) 
Low (labour 
serves one patient 
at a time although 
some on the 
capital side) 
Low-medium Medium Low High 
Heterogeneity 
of preferences 
Low 
Medium (as 
revealed by 
choices) 
Medium 
(language, 
pedagogy,  
protection of 
territorial 
minorities) 
High 
(variety of 
trainings) 
Low Low 
Externalities High Nil-Low 
Medium 
(required for 
private 
employment 
but some 
social benefits 
:raising 
children, 
participation 
in society) 
Medium 
(spillovers 
between 
jurisdictio
ns with 
labour 
mobility y 
Low Medium 
Redistribution Low 
High (low fees; 
capacity to pay 
with a user-pays 
tariff) 
Low (free 
access to 
compulsory 
school) 
Medium Low 
Low (even 
with toll 
roads, 
generally no 
redistributive 
consideration 
Source: Authors. 
2.3. Characteristics of Health Infrastructures and decentralization 
25. One can address the question of the decentralization of health infrastructures in a 
different way by noting that health infrastructures:  
 Have for various reasons increasing units costs per meter², as they become both 
more specialized, bigger and less numerous, as shown in Table 8. First, primary 
facilities will for example have exam rooms but not operating rooms found in 
secondary and tertiary facilities. Such surgery rooms are more expensive to build 
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and maintain. Second, the absolute size of secondary /tertiary facilities will require 
connecting spaces, isolation mechanisms (to avoid the spread of diseases) and so on. 
Third they will have more developed ancillary services such as cafeterias for their 
staff. This last item if fully self–financing will have no impact on costs but this 
requires charging a proper rent to these services or imputing depreciation and so on. 
Is there a trade-off between local control and the availability of technologically 
differentiated care? For example locally provided simple maternity services with 
slightly higher death rates than more sophisticated services with slightly better 
outcomes but further away from the place of residence of the expecting mother 
either because of better equipment or better skilled specialized MDs. Can distance 
spanning technology (tele-medicine) correct for this? Who decides what bundle of 
services to offer? 
Table 8: Construction cost per meter², three types of health centers, Seven selected countries, 2011, 
US$ 
Country Day centre 
(1) 
Regional hospital 
(2) 
General hospital 
(3) 
Ratio (3)/(1) 
Australia 3014 3400 5337 1.77 
Canada  3748 5774 6888 1.84 
China 679 823 920 1.35 
Germany  1960 3130 3410 1.74 
Malaysia  589 786 884 1.50 
South Africa 845 1056 1267 1.50 
Vietnam 676 1302 1302 1.93 
Source: International construction cost survey  Turner & Townsend 2012; Australia, p.8; Canada, p.10; China, p.12; 
Germany, p.14; Malaysia , p.22; South Africa, p.28; Vietnam, p.38. 
 Are (should be) meshed in spatial and specialized units network operated by various 
levels of governments making coordination between autonomous governments at a 
given level and between levels of autonomous governments an issue. Spatial 
coordination is horizontal between service precincts that deliver the same baskets of 
services. Vertical coordination is needed not only from the territorial point of view, 
but also for the assignment of specialities to each governmental layer. One may be 
faced with deconcentrated entities of devolved governments interacting together 
Thus one can ask if the coordination between levels of governments and 
governments at a given level is consensual or top down? Is it between local units 
producing services together? Through what means is coordination achieved? 
Through financial (ranging from soft, signalling devices like earmarking of 
funds…to hard, conditional, matching grants) financing; top down planning; or 
institutional [appointments of director positions , coordinating/dialog councils 
etc..]). Or put differently the assignment of services responsibilities (primary health; 
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secondary health, etc.) and the assignment for infrastructure provision may differ. 
The latter might change constantly as projects go through several stages of the 
planning building cycle. The planning cycle for a new secondary health facility may 
be initiated by a local group of potential users who are tired of incurring high private 
costs (time and money) to use facilities away from their residence in a growing 
urban centre. It may be taken up by a local politician or central deconcentrated 
bureaucrat who champions it, and then be formally accepted by the health planners.  
It is not always the case that the entity that plans, appraises, provides the budget etc., 
is also the one that implements or later also operates the facility.  Indeed, changing 
ownership of infrastructure over time is often required under private sector financial 
arrangements;  
 Are subject like all public projects to costs overruns. We were unable to find a 
systematic comparisons of the extant of cost overruns  by type of infrastructure –
education, health, roads- or by type of health facility (hospital, clinic).There is 
however evidence for transportation projects that costs overrun are more important 
for technologically complex projects at 45% for trains, 34% for fixed 
links(bridges..) and 20% for roads
6
 .The authors conclude that
7
: 
 Cost underestimation exists across 20 nations 
and 5 continents; it appears to be a global 
phenomenon. 
 Cost underestimation appears to be more pronounced in 
developing nations than in North America and Europe (data for rail 
projects 
only). 
 Cost underestimation has not decreased over the 
past 70 years. No learning that would improve 
cost estimate accuracy seems to take place. 
 Cost underestimation cannot be explained by 
error and seems to be best explained by strategic 
misrepresentation, i.e., lying. 
 Transportation infrastructure projects do not appear to be more 
prone to cost underestimation than are other types of large 
projects. 
 Have both characteristics of a stand-alone service and of network. Going further 
than the stand alone-network dimension, one must note the jointness of the services. 
They are both private and public in nature.  Private in that both rivalry and exclusion 
apply: when patient A is hooked up to a given machine, patient B is not. And one 
can exclude A or B using the pricing mechanism (should one do it is another issue). 
Public in that the health network is available to all when an accident occurs; indeed 
access to emergency services is a priority in health institutions with triage giving 
more immediate access to more urgent cases;  
                                                          
6
 Bent Flyvbjerg , Mette Skamris Holm & Soren Buhl (2002) Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: 
Error or Lie? , Journal of the American Planning Association, 68:3, 279-295, table 1, p283 
7
 Ibid, p290 
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 Are more often in competition with private providers than roads or primary schools 
infrastructures. There is not only competition between private and public 
hospitals/clinics in a given territory/ jurisdiction but also potential competition 
across jurisdictions between public hospitals. The normative reference here is that of 
FOCJs (for Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions) put forward by Frey 
and Eichenberger (1979) Thus health zone borders and the rules that govern their 
setting and crossing will matter to infrastructure decisions. Do patients decide (if 
they have a choice and there are payment agreements)? Or are hospitals built 
independent of consideration of demand? Can private facilities offer only a subset of 
profitable activities or are they required to offer full coverage? With or without full 
payment by the public providers or private insurers and using what price list? And 
what about the micro-locational choice of building a hospital within a given 
territory?  
 Are affected by a combination of roads and ambulances in two ways. First, this links 
the three tiers of institutions. An improvement in this network (lower travelling 
time, less jarring travel) facilitates the coordinated provision of services. It may also 
facilitate regrouping specialized activities in a smaller number of facilities. The 
resulting improvement in quality may well more than compensate for the additional 
cash and time costs to access them.  Second, the same improvement may, depending 
on the existing spatial distribution, reduce the required number of primary care units 
since it may reduce the travel time of users of such facilities. Note that this matters 
the most for emergencies and unplanned health consumption.
8
 However better roads 
by facilitating the growth of private transportation options such as buses or moto-
taxis may modify the supply of available services.  
26. Let us return to the FOCJ issue. Assume two hospitals A and B located in two adjacent 
jurisdictions JA and JB; they are monopolies. Since the population of JA is larger than JB (but 
not too large so as to avoid the upward sloping part of the cost curve), A has lower operating 
costs than B due to economies of scale along the same cost function. If the rules stipulate that 
residents of JA are treated in hospital A and the same for JB except in case of emergencies, 
then the only issue is how both hospitals are compensated in that case: using their price/cost 
structure which is higher in B than A or the price structure of the place of residence of the 
patient.  
27. But what happens if patients are allowed to access health services where they wish if 
they reside within fifty kms of the JA-JB border?  Or if the monopoly clause is abandoned?
9
 
Then if they must contribute a copayment (deductible) to the cost of their health care, 
                                                          
8. The exact relationship between health facilities and transport is not clear; see Toloo, Sam; FitzGerald, 
Gerard; Aitken, Peter; Ting, Joseph; Tippett, Vivienne; Chu, Kevin (2011) Emergency Health Services: Demand 
and Service Delivery Models. Monograph 1: Literature Review and Activity Trends. Queensland University of 
Technology  
9. This is the very precise sense of FOCJs: Functional because the two service precincts supply the same 
function, here hospital health care; Overlapping since with C for Competing, the functional  area for hospital A is 
not only JA but also JB (or part of it in the 50 km deep border example), and inversely for hospital B. Thus the 
institutional and functional territories are not identical: for hospital A the functional territory is JA and JB 
whereas the institutional limit is the political governmental unit JA in charge of the public hospital A; and the 
reciprocal for hospital B. 
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residents of JB may prefer to use hospital A. Note that the lower cost in A is not due to greater 
efficiency or better procedures but simply to the size of JA relative to JB. This means than 
when planning its supply of services hospital A will plan on a share of JB residents, Bm (m 
for mobile) as users and thus will adjust its infrastructure size upwards accordingly. It could 
even pursue a proactive competition to attract more Bm users (behind fifty kms) and gain 
further economies of scale (going further in the upward sloping part of the cost curve). How 
will hospital B react? It could give up Bm users and thus plan on JB-Bm users with the 
required adjustment in services offered and thus the necessary infrastructure along with higher 
costs. Or it could ramp up its offerings targeting Am users; this would require it to invest 
more in infrastructure so as to lower its costs to the level of A. In this second case, it may well 
be able to retain the Bm users. Overall, however, both hospitals may have planned for too 
large a clientele in the absence of coordination. In hospital investment planning, as for other 
public services which are capital intensive, a pure FOCJ approach clearly leads to non-
cooperative outcomes and, thus, allocative inefficiencies.  
28. The main conclusions one can draw from this first part of the paper are:  
 health services include both public and private (as defined by economists) services; 
 the delivery of both types of services is often carried out by the same agent even 
though their impact and financing are different;  
 there are important benefits (economies of scales, expertise , better outcomes) to a 
tiered system with specialized care provided in specialised institutions that are less 
numerous and thus further away from users than basic health services centers; 
 tiered systems require substantial horizontal and vertical coordination due to 
geographic spillovers  as well as vigilance against over provision; 
 infrastructure costs increase per patient served with specialization of the health 
facility; thus intergovernmental finance arrangements for both operating and 
infrastructure provision matter. 
 Leaving hospital units competing for patient beyond their “natural” jurisdiction may 
lead to non-cooperative options and thus inefficiencies.  
3. Case studies and policy choices 
29. A key issue of this paper is how health facilities in general and hospitals in particular 
are or should be financed in a decentralized setting. One way to answer this question is to 
examine how it is done in various countries in the world. Another way is to examine the 
debate between proponents and opponents of Private Public Partnership (PPP).That done we 
can turn to plausible policy recommendations.   
3.1. Financing health facilities; country evidence  
30. We examine information for three countries which are the United State, Canada and 
Switzerland with more attention on the later as it has since 1990 undergone changes in the 
provision and financing of health of particular interest in the context of this paper.  
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United States  
31. We begin with the United States where financing for hospitals is mainly from financial 
markets but not always as we shall see. In the USA, access to markets by hospitals is a key 
factor in the financing of health infrastructure. Sussman and Jordahl (2010) examine the 
situation following the upheaval in the bond market of 2008. They argue that (p.7): “Health 
care is a very capital-intensive business and access to debt financing keeps hospitals in 
business. Few hospitals today can generate enough cash flow from their operations and 
reserves to fund short and long-term strategic investments in people, programs, facilities, and 
technology. Most hospitals must access external debt on a periodic basis to assure the 
provision of continued health care services in their communities. The ability to issue and 
support debt is not a “nice-to-have” capability; it is essential to the viability of nearly all U.S. 
hospitals and health systems.” Hospitals often finance themselves by issuing municipal bonds 
and were thus quite affected by the collapse of the insurers in that market in 2007-2008. 
Hospitals bonds are about 10 times more risky than standard municipal bonds (WSJ 8-9 
2012).
10
 Thus Sussman and Jordahl,(2010, p.11)  identify eight financing options: municipal 
bonds, direct bank loans, FHA Section 242 credit enhancement, leasing, USDA Rural 
Development Program, New Market Tax Credit Program, debt restructuring, and asset sales. 
Some are standard access to private markets (municipal bonds(issued by municipalities on 
behalf of hospitals to take advantage of their established credit rating) , direct bank loans, 
leasing) while others use a mortgage guaranty from the federal government to reduce 
borrowing costs (Federal Housing Administration Section 242) or a mortgage guaranty or 
direct loans from the USDA Rural Development Community Facilities Program for health 
facilities in rural areas and towns with populations of up to 20,000.
11
 For the direct loans, 
there are three levels of interest rates set according to the median household income and the 
type of project: poverty rate, market rate (set by U.S. Treasury Department) and the 
intermediate rate is set halfway between these two. The rate used depends on the median 
household income (MHI) of the area and the type of project being financed. Finally the New 
Market Tax Credit Program allows individual and corporate investors to receive a tax credit 
against their Federal income tax return in exchange for investing in Community Development 
Entities (CDEs).
12
 The credit totals 39 percent of the original investment amount and is 
claimed over a period of seven years.  
32. The use of bond financing is likely to result in more autonomous investment choices by 
hospitals than the use of grants financing presented below for Canada and Switzerland. 
Thus bond financing  result sin less vertical and horizontal coordination than since it is 
not the result of centralized decisions but of market choices  
Canada 
33. Before WWII the provision of private health services was funded by private payments 
either from the pocket of the patients or from their insurance with in some cases subsidies to 
                                                          
10. Hospitals' Debt Gets a Checkup: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444900304577579360896916848.html  
11. For more details see http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/HAD-CF_Loans.html  
12. For more details see http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/programs_id.asp?programID=5  
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the poor by provinces. It is after WWII that there is involvement of the governments in the 
provision of health services. With respect to intergovernmental relations four items should be 
noted.
13
  
1. National Health Grants are introduced in 1948 by the federal government mainly for 
capital expenditures; 
2.  The federal Hospital and Diagnostics Services Act comes into effect in 1958; it uses 
a50-50 cost-sharing formula for covering hospital costs; 
3. The federal Medical Care Insurance Act comes in force in 1996; it also uses a 50-50 
cost sharing formula covering the cost of services by MDs in hospitals and their 
private offices. 
4. A series of health accords in the early 2000s leading to increased federal funding. 
34. This broadening financing by the federal government occurred often because 
‘’provincial push led to federal pull in convening the provinces and in drawing them into an 
intergovernmental arrangement’’ (Maioni, 2002, p3). So provinces introduced hospital 
insurance and then encouraged federal financing , knowing that there was interest at that level 
of government for doing this given past policy statements. One interesting point for us is that 
while infrastructure spending was the entry point,
14
 it quickly became insufficient as a policy 
tool. Now in Canada there is no federal program funding hospital infrastructure. Hospital 
capital funding is usually a mix of (i) public funds provided by the province which borrows it 
or finances it out of general revenues and transfers it as grants to hospitals and (ii) privately 
raised funds by the foundation of the hospital carrying out a capital project. For example in 
Montreal, the main children’s hospital (Sainte-Justine) just launched a capital campaign to 
raise 150 million Can $ with the support of Céline Dion. The previous campaign raised 125 
million used for new buildings.
15
  
35. Federal capital grants were made between 1948 and 1969 and then anew as of 2000. 
The first type of grants was mainly for buildings while the second are for medical equipment. 
In both cases, grants are to provinces which pass them on to hospitals. There is no direct 
federal payment to hospitals as in the USA. That said, federal grants finance provincial 
priorities rather than determining them. Provincial priorities are set mainly by their respective 
ministries of health with inputs from intra-provincial bodies such as health districts.   
36. Public capital in hospital is in the range of 3-4 percent of GDP in Canada in the 1961 -
2001 period;
16
 it is declining slightly between 1981 and 2001 while health spending increases, 
yielding a lower output/ capital ratio.  
37. Day to day operations are under the control of autonomous hospitals who decide 
within the constraints of collective agreements that can be more or less uniform across 
hospitals such things as staffing levels, MDs accreditation, type of services offered and so    
                                                          
13. We draw this information from the Appendix: Key Events in Health Insurance Legislation in Canada in 
Maioni. 
14. ‘‘The grants offering financial support for planning and organization, public health, and hospital 
construction’’ HEALTH POLICY IN CANADA Prepared by:Nancy Miller Chenier Political and Social Affairs 
Division Revised 4 December 2002 http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/934-e.htm  
15. http://fr.canoe.ca/divertissement/celebrites/nouvelles/2012/12/12/20426166-qmi.html  
16. Mackenzie(2004) Chart 5, p.10. 
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on. Surpluses or deficits may result from day to day operations. Deficits are quite common in 
Canadian hospitals
17
 ; while usually not allowed by regulations or laws, provinces cover them 
as provincial subsidies account for a substantial amount of hospital financing
18
. One 
explanation for this behaviour is that at least in some provinces hospital deficits are not part of 
provincial deficits and thus the underfunding of hospitals that results in these deficits appear 
as cost cutting measures.  Of interest to us is how surpluses are used; this is addressed 
managed by McKillop (2002). In the case of Canada, he finds (Table 5, p.18) that in some 
provinces it is recommended that they be used for capital equipment ( Alberta, British 
Columbia, Ontario) in others part (Manitoba) or all PEI) goes back to provinces.  
Switzerland 
38. Up to the 1990s, the Swiss hospital system was comprised of three levels.  Level 1 was 
small and regional hospitals, mainly operated by local governments (communes) organized 
except for large ones in multi-communal hospital districts.
19
  Most of these establishments 
had religious or private charity origins.  At level 2 one finds cantonal hospitals with more 
developed services while there are a few level 3 highly specialized university /cantonal 
hospitals (Genève, Lausanne, Berne, Zurich, Basel-Town), carrying out research activities and 
using cutting edge technologies.  Level 3 hospitals are not federal; they are operated by the 
canton where they are located with horizontal access and cost sharing agreements 
(concordats) with neighboring cantons.  
39. In the 1990s, centralization began when the cantons started promulgating technical 
norms and minimum standard requirements in order to limit inefficiencies: this was the case 
when new technology appeared (scanning instead of X-rays for example) so as to avoid each 
district hospital acquiring its own equipment that could serve more that the residents of the 
hospital district; or to improve quality with a minimum number of acts (obstetric departments 
are good examples).  
40. In the 2000s, centralization accelerated. In most cantons, vertical coordination was 
obtained through the merging of district hospitals (level 1) into the cantonal level 2 in order to 
organize a larger cantonal hospital network.
20
 This meant that – not without heated political 
debates in cantonal Parliaments and opposition in the rural areas – several district hospitals 
                                                          
17
 For Ontario see More than one-third of Ontario hospitals didn't balance books MARIA BABBAGE 
TORONTO — THE GLOBE AND MAIL Last updated Thursday, Aug. 23 2012  
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/more-than-one-third-of-ontario-hospitals-didnt-balance-
books/article1320892/?service=mobile ; For Québec  see Quebec to appoint financial monitor at MUHC 
McGill hospital centre's deficit could hit $115M CBC News Posted: Dec 18, 2012 6:58 AM ET Last Updated: Dec 18, 
2012 10:27 PM EThttp://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2012/12/18/muhc-cuts-patient-care.html  
18
 90% in 2010 Figure 14, p19 National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2011  Canadian Institute for health 
Information https://secure.cihi.ca/free_products/nhex_trends_report_2011_en.pdf  
19. In several places, the functional limits of the hospital service jurisdiction overlap over two cantons. This is not 
uncommon and shows how federalism can organize adaptable and creative solutions in order to gain efficiency and 
economies of scale, taking into consideration distance and cantonal frontiers. These special jurisdictions sometimes 
have been given as illustrative examples of FOCJs. But the analogy is not correct. They were functional jurisdiction, 
but neither overlapping (their position was monopolistic in the territory of the members communes) nor competing 
(hospital of first and second level were attributed their own political boundaries and hospitalized persons could not 
“choose” other establishments). 
20. For example in the cantons of Valais in 2004, Neuchâtel 2006, Vaud and Fribourg 2007. 
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were closed. Between 2000 and 2010, more than 35 percent of Swiss hospitals were closed.
21
 
This centralization was eased also by the improvement of mobile medical technologies found 
in ambulances and the development of helicopter rescue and inter-hospital link.  
41. Two points are of interest in this move towards centralization: the arguments that are 
proposed for centralization at the cantonal level and the public finance solution.  
42. In most cases, the arguments for the cantonalization of hospitals can be summarized as 
follows
22
: 
 This stops a race between district hospitals leading to over equipment overall at that 
level;  
 This stops encroachment by district hospital in the areas of competencies of cantonal 
hospitals, preventing the consequent vertical inefficiencies; 
 This allows better organization in the purchase of medical products and equipment (no 
local overstocking yet more cantonal power in price negotiation); 
 This facilitates harmonization of the management, computer program, billing and 
other bureaucratic measures; 
 This creates scale economies in infrastructures and equipment; 
 This increases the quality of medical and surgery service delivered with a higher 
number carried out in each now larger hospital (practice makes perfect argument). 
43. Financing the re-assignment of hospital care and thus investments from the communes 
to the cantons was done by modifying the taxation of various bases (mainly taxes on personal 
income and wealth, and on corporate profit and capital) levied by both communes and 
cantons. As one knows, re-assigning functions in a federal or decentralized system always 
creates budgetary problems. One way to render acceptable this shift is to group bottom-up and 
top-down re-assignments so as to obtain a zero-sum change. This has proved to be both 
difficult and hazardous not only at the moment of the re-assignment, but also because the 
rates of growth of the re-assigned functions can take unexpected paths – with the result that 
losers in a given round are reluctant to take on a second re-assignment round. This pitfall was 
avoided using an innovative technique (innovative in Switzerland at least): the vertical 
compensation of the tax coefficient on direct taxation. Each canton calculated how much the 
communes paid, in this case for hospital care, infrastructures and equipment in the last three 
(sometimes five) years preceding the shift. Then the ratio (total past communal hospital 
expenditure) / (the tax base) is used to calculate the relevant communal tax coefficient. In 
counterpart, the communes have the obligation to reduce their own tax coefficient (piggyback 
taxation) in proportion.
23
    
                                                          
21. « Statisques de la santé 2010 », pages 71-76, vol. 14, Federal Office of Statistics, Neuchâtel 
www.bfs.admin.ch/portal/fr/index/news/publications. Consulted February 1, 2013. 
22. Message 251, March 13, 2006 for the executive government of canton Fribourg to the Parliament explaining 
the draft law on the cantonal hospital network (Message in French): pages 1 and 2. The arguments developed in this 
Message are illustrative of the arguments previously forwarded in other cantons (see footnote 17). 
23. In the canton of Neuchâtel, the cantonal coefficient was increased with 0.30 from 1.00 to 1.30 and the 
communes’ tax coefficients were globally reduced by 0,30 points. [Note: in the tax system T = t x B x k where t is 
the tax rate schedule, B the tax base and k the annual coefficient; k=1 gives T=t x B which is the basic tax schedule 
written in the law, k serves to balance the budget. The calculation was (∑hospital expenditures in the communes 
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44. Let us now turn to the magnitude of decentralized health expenditures in general and 
for investments.  Table 9 summarizes the situation for the period 1990-2010
24
.  Investment 
expenditures at the cantonal and communal level have varied from 9.3 percent of total 
hospital and home expenditures in 1990, decreasing to 7.7 percent in 2000 and going back to 
over 10 percent from 2008 onwards.  The 2005-2007 figures are lower: they concerns the 
years where cantonalisation took place in many cantons, thus limiting new investments in that 
period of institutional re-organization.  The cantons’ shares of investment expenditures have 
regularly increased over time, compared to the communes’ share, from 64/36 percent in 1990 
to 85/15 percent in 2010, and this will certainly continue in the near future up to a near 100 
percent in the cantons’ hands.  The Confederation does not operate hospital; it only legislates 
in that area.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
divided per B the total cantonal tax base = ∆k)]. This global negative move was strongly criticized thereafter by 
individual communes because it did not correspond to their own hospital expenditures.  
In the canton of Fribourg, the cantonal tax coefficient on direct taxation (personal income and wealth, corporate 
profit and capital) was increased from 1,00 to 1,089 points. The communes had to reduce accordingly their own 
coefficient. The decrease was calculated for each commune. In the author’s commune, this corresponded to a 
decrease in the tax coefficient from 0.85 to 0.77 points. 
24. In the nomenclature of Swiss public accounting, health expenditures are regrouped under Function 4, and 
several sub-functions.  In Table 9, hospital infrastructures concern subgroup 411 Hospitals, 412 Homes for elderly 
people and 413 Psychatric Hospitals and Clinics, which all give in-patient health care, grouped in sub-function 41. 
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Table 9   Public Health Expenditure, Switzerland, 1990-2010, in 1,000 CHF 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total hospital and home 9,914,075 13,140,682 14,319,763 18,242,477 18,435,598 19,300,901 8,258,495 8,788,580 8,815,252 
Health expenditure : total 10,769,188 14,251,061 15,579,322 19,751,925 19,974,506 21,072,410 10,634,149 11,270,274 11,328,790 
Public expenditures: total 105,118,888 139,873,305 151,836,715 176,235,767 176,973,488 183,706,306 187,890,993 185,536,151 189,407,520 
            
Total hospital and retirement home/ Total 
Health spending %  
92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 78% 78% 78% 
Health Spending / total public expenditures 
% 
10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 6%* 6%* 6%* 
Cantons' share in Total hospital and 
retirement home 41 
60 56 56 58 59 59 91 91 92 
Communes' share in Total hospital and 
retirement home 41 
40 44 44 42 41 41 9 9 8 
           
Investment share in Total hospital and 
retirement home 
9.3 8.8 7.7 5.3 4.6 5.7 10.6 10.2 10.3 
Cantons' share in health Investment% 64 74 72 67 73 79 78 80 85 
Communes' share in health investment  % 36 26 28 33 27 21 22 20 15 
Sources: Federal Department of Finance, Berne, http://www.efv.admin.ch/  > Documentation > Statistique financière > Rapport > Modèle SF > sous-secteur et 
agrégats. Authors’ report and calculation from various Tables: F11.7, F40.7.5, F23.7 F70.7.5, F80.7.5 (all refresh 31.01.2013). PIB: SECO, 25.09.2012. 
Information about the investment share in 41 and the cantons’ and communes respective shares in  percent have been obtained directly from the Federal 
Department of Finance, 01.02.2013. 
Note: This drop is the result of a statistical artifact noted above. 
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45. From 2012 onwards, hospital financing has changed radically. Following years of political debate, 
the federal government imposed on the cantons and hospitals a funding system based on 
federally set unit costs for each medical act.  Hospital expenditures will no longer be covered 
through lump-sum amounts and contracts with private health insurances. Thus the federal 
government sets the value of each medical act; the hospitals are reimbursed according to this 
fee schedule, which applies to all hospital throughout the country. It benefits the hospital to be 
as efficient (cost minimizing) as possible given the fee schedule. Also new is that, at least on 
paper, the patient can chose which hospital to use – cantonal and district hospitals have lost 
their territorial monopoly. The objective is to increase competition between establishments and, 
through competition, to increase efficiency and lower hospital recurrent costs per medical act 
and thus per patient. Finally, according to the new law, the cantons will have to cover at least 55 
percent of the hospital costs, current and capital. After one year of implementation, some 
problems already appear. (i) the implicit hypothesis of the single fee schedule is that all hospital 
are on the same position in the U-shape cost curve right from the beginning, this does not rely 
on empirical evidence and is unlikely to hold given the existing territory/clientele served by each 
hospital; (ii) since savings are not easily done in terms of spending on investment, equipment or 
medical products, pressure to save occurs mainly on human resources. Medical staff and nurses 
are complaining that priority is given to medical acts rather than to the relationship between 
staff and hospitalized patients; this relationship may matter more for their well-being but is not 
taken into account by the fee schedule. Thus some health experts are arguing that the system 
should return to cooperative rather than competitive federalism since hospital functions are first 
collective goods and not market services. It is too early to say if patient mobility and the capacity 
to choose one’s hospital anywhere in Switzerland will enhance quality and efficiency. If it does, 
then this shift towards a more competitive (private) type of provision of hospital services may 
have been for the better; otherwise, it is most likely for the worse.  
46. The discussion above only examines the public hospital health sector and says nothing about 
the private sector or PPP. Unfortunately, actual statistical data blur the debate on public/ 
private hospital so that the issue becomes uncontrollable. Consider the following   situation 
(2010). The left column gives the number of establishments in the functional classification; 
the middle one the nature of the unit. 
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47.  
[function 411] 
121 hospitals 
30 university and cantonal  
91 regional and small 
84 public or private and subsidized 
37 private and not subsidized 
[function 412] 
1523 home for 
elderly people 
 465 public 
467 private and subsidized 
455 private and not subsidized 
[function 413]  
179 clinics 
88 selected hospital care and 
specialties  
50 psychiatric 
41 physical disability re-adaptation 
72 public or private and subsidized 
107 private and not subsidized 
   
Source :  « Statistiques de la santé 2010 », pages 71-76, vol. 14, Federal Statistical Office, Neuchâtel 
www.bfs.admin.ch/portal/fr/index/news/publications. Consulted February 1, 2013. 
 
 
The interest of these figures is in the right hand-side column. According to the normative view 
developed in section 2, only hospital units that deliver a collective good in terms of hospital 
health care, mainly with open access and day-night emergency services, should be (partly) 
funded out of public budget. But one can no longer cross-cut public /private ownership with 
collective service/ individual care when public finance statistical data are organized according 
to the SEC95.25 In there, the concept of “economically significant prices”26 and a system of 
pricing which is applied to both public and private hospital have eliminated from the “public” 
statistics into the “private” sector a substantial number of publicly-owned hospitals. Hospital 
health expenditures have not been reduced, nor have they disappeared. They are simply 
recorded in the private sector and not accessible. This is more than unfortunate since hospital 
policy remains essentially in public hands.  
                                                          
25 See Manual of Government Deficit and Debt, Implementation of ESA95, Eurostat Methodologies and Working 
Papers, European Commission, Luxembourg, 2012, 4
th
 edition, pages 14-16. Also 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/fra/index.htm;  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/publication 
Déficit et dette, epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>government finance statistics>manuel ; 
26
 This is the 50% criterion : if half or more of the relevant total costs (to be defined ?) are financed through user 
charges and bills to patient, then the producing unit is classified in the private merchant sector of the economy. 
Note that this methodology is adopted by the big five: EU,  IMF, WB, UN and OCDE. In consequence, the discussion 
in this paragraph goes much further than the simple “Swiss” case that is described. 
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48. A complement to a more market oriented provision of health services is a more market 
oriented financing of health investments as embodied in PPP. We thus turn to a 
discussion of this financing system now.  
PPP 
49. Montagu and Harding (2012) examine the role of the private sector in the provision of 
health services and health infrastructure. They first note a fair amount of confusion in the 
terminology and propose four definitions.  
Services: Operating contract: A private organization is brought in to operate and 
deliver publicly-funded health services within a public facility. 
Facility/finance: PFI: A public agency contracts a private entity to finance, design, 
build and operate a hospital facility. Health services within the facility are provided by 
government. 
Combined BOT+PPIP:  A private organization establishes capacity (through new 
construction or expansion of existing facility) to provide health services under sustained 
public or social insurance reimbursement. 
Co-location: A public agency allocates a portion of a public hospital’s land and/or 
premises for sustained use by a private organization in exchange for payment and 
specified benefits to the public agency. 
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Table 10     
 Infrastructure PPPs Hospital PPPs Implications 
Government vs 
Private 
purchaser of 
output 
Private buyers/payers 
• Government does not enter 
into long-term service 
purchasing relationship as 
part of transaction 
Government (or social 
health insurers) buy all 
or most services 
• Government enters into 
long-term service 
purchasing relationship 
as part of transaction 
Substantial risks to government 
payer as a result of long-term 
funding “lock in” obligation 
• Substantial political risks to private 
partners in hospital PPP 
Business risk vs 
Political risk 
Borrowing costs reflect 
estimated risk of demand for 
infrastructure services by 
total market of potential 
payers 
Borrowing costs reflect 
risks associated with 
single (or multiple) 
government payer 
agencies 
Cost of finance (and therefore 
capital) higher for hospital facility 
investment 
Measurability Comparators for 
benchmarking cost of 
facility availability services 
are somewhat limited 
Comparators for 
benchmarking cost of 
services often extremely 
limited 
Probability of that payment contract 
will set excessive rates is higher for 
hospitals 
Variability of 
outputs over time 
Products stable over time Products highly variable 
due to volatility in 
demographics and 
disease 
• Risk to private partners 
necessitating either higher return 
contingencies, or flexibility in 
contract modification 
• Risk to government due to “locked 
in” commitment to hospitals/ 
configuration that may not be 
needed in the future 
Variability of 
technology over 
time 
Service delivery technology 
and organizational models 
change slowly 
Service delivery 
technology and 
organizational models 
change rapidly 
Risks to government and private 
partners as a result of lost flexibility 
to adapt service organization; or cost 
of unpredictable adjustments to 
technology, systems and staffing 
Ratio of 
investment to 
operating capital 
High ratio of capital to 
operating costs 
Low ratio of capital to 
operating costs 
Efficiency gains from private 
finance/ design/ construction and 
operation of hospital PPPs lower 
than for infrastructure PPPs 
Source: Table 2 as such: Montagu and Harding (2012). 
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50. McKee et al (2006) review various PP health facilities and note several issues both 
financial (Box 10) and in terms of quality of the facilities. Their abstract summarizes well the 
issues:  
“Although experience is still very limited and rigorous evaluations lacking, four issues 
have emerged: cost, quality, flexibility and complexity. New facilities have, in general, 
been more expensive than they would have been if procured using traditional methods. 
Compared with the traditional system, new facilities are more likely to be built on time 
and within budget, but this seems often to be at the expense of compromises on quality. 
The need to minimize the risk to the parties means that it is very difficult to “future-
proof” facilities in a rapidly changing world. Finally, such projects are extremely, and 
in some cases prohibitively, complex. While it is premature to say whether the problems 
experienced relate to the underlying model or to their implementation, it does seem that 
a public–private partnership further complicates the already difficult task of building 
and operating a hospital.” 
51. A presentation by Loening27 shows that while the major spending item of hospitals is 
on delivery of care (54 percent), the second largest item at 15 percent is construction.  
52. The main conclusions one can draw from this part of the paper are that:  
 there are various models commonly used to finance health infrastructure, relying 
more or less on debt and more or less on private funds; 
 as shown for Switzerland it is possible to modify the role of various levels of 
governments in the provision of health services through more centralization for 
example but this needs to be accompanied by well thought out changes in financial 
arrangements;  
 one model often put forward as the modern way, the PPP, should be considered with 
great caution 
Conclusion 
53. Investment in health infrastructure is carried out to provide health services. These are 
amongst the commonly provided public services those that use more specialized manpower. 
Thus the complementarity of human and physical capital is an important factor in designing a 
proper health infrastructure funding arrangement. One must also note that the availability of 
medications is a key part of successful health outcomes. A second important factor is the need 
for quick universal access in case of emergency since not all health needs are predictable; this 
requires taking into account networks interactions between roads, ambulances and facilities.  
Third, one must balance the benefits and costs or concentrating care in specialized care 
centers.  
                                                          
27. 2007 World Bank Workshop on Public Private Collaboration in Health Care Provision, Montenegro:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/EXTECAREGTOPHEANUT/0,,conte
ntMDK:21494453~isCURL:Y~menuPK:3256336~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:511545,00.ht
ml  
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54. One difficult issue is that there are three inputs in health and particularly curative 
health services: labor, structures and technology. The last one changes faster than the 
technology in education or road maintenance and trends higher cost wise. In a decentralized 
health system, how should one fund technology? As an ongoing cost or as a depreciable (at 
what rate) infrastructure? Does this have an impact on horizontal cooperation? For example 
one equips hospital A with technology T1, then B with T2, the A with T3 and so on in some 
kind of leapfrogging approach? With patients in the catchment area A sent to B when T2 
benefits them and vice versa for T3. Or does give T1 to A and B, skip T2 and go for T3 with a 
period when T2 which is useful is not available thus reducing the quality of health care for a 
while for all. 
55. These various factors combined with the fact that one often finds decentralized 
(devolved) provision of health care with a link between less specialized care and smaller 
governments has consequences for the funding of infrastructure. In general, it will make sense 
to have a funding and standards role for the national government or at least large SNGs to 
internalize externalities and optimize the network while avoiding a medical arms race.
28
  
56. Finally, it is common to end a paper for a plea for more research. Here we believe this 
would not be useful given the lack of data. So we end with a plea for more data comparable 
over time and space. This is necessary not only for research but also to guide policy.  
  
                                                          
28. A term commonly used in health policy research. For example see Changes in Hospital Competitive 
Strategy: A New Medical Arms Race? Health Services Research. 2003 February; 38(1 Pt 2): 447–469 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1360894/ 
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